美国总统拜登签署“美国供应链行政令”-行政令全文

admin管理员组

文章数量:1565791

2024年7月15日发(作者：)

Executive Order on America’s Supply Chains

FEBRUARY 24, 2021 • PRESIDENTIAL ACTIONS

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of

the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. Policy. The United States needs resilient, diverse, and secure

supply chains to ensure our economic prosperity and national

security. Pandemics and other biological threats, cyber-attacks, climate shocks

and extreme weather events, terrorist attacks, geopolitical and economic

competition, and other conditions can reduce critical manufacturing capacity and

the availability and integrity of critical goods, products, and services. Resilient

American supply chains will revitalize and rebuild domestic manufacturing

capacity, maintain America’s competitive edge in research and development, and

create well-paying jobs. They will also support small businesses, promote

prosperity, advance the fight against climate change, and encourage economic

growth in communities of color and economically distressed areas.

More resilient supply chains are secure and diverse — facilitating greater

domestic production, a range of supply, built-in redundancies, adequate stockpiles,

safe and secure digital networks, and a world-class American manufacturing base

and workforce. Moreover, close cooperation on resilient supply chains with allies

and partners who share our values will foster collective economic and national

security and strengthen the capacity to respond to international disasters and

emergencies.

Therefore, it is the policy of my Administration to strengthen the resilience of

America’s supply chains.

Sec. 2. Coordination. The Assistant to the President for National Security

Affairs (APNSA) and the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy (APEP) shall

coordinate the executive branch actions necessary to implement this order

through the interagency process identified in National Security Memorandum 2 of

February 4, 2021 (Renewing the National Security Council System). In

implementing this order, the heads of agencies should, as appropriate, consult

outside stakeholders — such as those in industry, academia, non-governmental

organizations, communities, labor unions, and State, local, and Tribal governments

— in order to fulfill the policy identified in section 1 of this order.

Sec. 3. 100-Day Supply Chain Review. (a) To advance the policy described

in section 1 of this order, the APNSA and the APEP, in coordination with the heads

of appropriate agencies, as defined in section 6(a) of this order, shall complete a

review of supply chain risks, as outlined in subsection (b) of this section, within 100

days of the date of this order.

(b) Within 100 days of the date of this order, the specified heads of agencies

shall submit the following reports to the President, through the APNSA and the

APEP:

(i) The Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the heads of

appropriate agencies, shall submit a report identifying risks in the semiconductor

manufacturing and advanced packaging supply chains and policy

recommendations to address these risks. The report shall include the items

described in section 4(c) of this order.

(ii) The Secretary of Energy, in consultation with the heads of

appropriate agencies, shall submit a report identifying risks in the supply chain for

high-capacity batteries, including electric-vehicle batteries, and policy

recommendations to address these risks. The report shall include the items

described in section 4(c) of this order.

(iii) The Secretary of Defense (as the National Defense Stockpile

Manager), in consultation with the heads of appropriate agencies, shall submit

a report identifying risks in the supply chain for critical minerals and other

identified strategic materials, including rare earth elements (as determined by the

Secretary of Defense), and policy recommendations to address these risks. The

report shall also describe and update work done pursuant to Executive Order

13953 of September 30, 2020 (Addressing the Threat to the Domestic Supply

Chain From Reliance on Critical Minerals From Foreign Adversaries and Supporting

the Domestic Mining and Processing Industries). The report shall include

the items described in section 4(c) of this order.

(iv) The Secretary of Health and Human Services, in consultation with

the heads of appropriate agencies, shall submit a report identifying risks in the

supply chain for pharmaceuticals and active pharmaceutical ingredients and policy

recommendations to address these risks. The report shall complement the

ongoing work to secure the supply chains of critical items needed to combat the

COVID-19 pandemic, including personal protective equipment, conducted

pursuant to Executive Order 14001 of January 21, 2021 (A Sustainable Public

Health Supply Chain). The report shall include the items described in section 4(c)

of this order.

(c) The APNSA and the APEP shall review the reports required under

subsection (b) of this section and shall submit the reports to the President in an

unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(d) The APNSA and the APEP shall include a cover memorandum to the set

of reports submitted pursuant to this section, summarizing the reports’ findings

and making any additional overall recommendations for addressing the risks to

America’s supply chains, including the supply chains for the products identified

in subsection (b) of this section.

Sec. 4. Sectoral Supply Chain Assessments. (a) Within 1 year of the date of

this order, the specified heads of agencies shall submit the following reports to the

President, through the APNSA and the APEP:

(i) The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the heads of

appropriate agencies, shall submit a report on supply chains for the defense

industrial base that updates the report provided pursuant to Executive Order

13806 of July 21, 2017 (Assessing and Strengthening the Manufacturing and

Defense Industrial Base and Supply Chain Resiliency of the United States), and

builds on the Annual Industrial Capabilities Report mandated by the Congress

pursuant to section 2504 of title 10, United States Code. The report shall identify

areas where civilian supply chains are dependent upon competitor nations, as

determined by the Secretary of Defense.

(ii) The Secretary of Health and Human Services, in consultation with the

heads of appropriate agencies, shall submit a report on supply chains for the

public health and biological preparedness industrial base (as determined by the

Secretary of Health and Human Services). The report shall complement the work

conducted pursuant to section 4 of Executive Order 14001.

(iii) The Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of Homeland Security,

in consultation with the heads of appropriate agencies, shall submit a report on

supply chains for critical sectors and subsectors of the information and

communications technology (ICT) industrial base (as determined by the Secretary

of Commerce and the Secretary of Homeland Security), including the industrial

base for the development of ICT software, data, and associated services.

(iv) The Secretary of Energy, in consultation with the heads of

appropriate agencies, shall submit a report on supply chains for the energy sector

industrial base (as determined by the Secretary of Energy).

(v) The Secretary of Transportation, in consultation with the heads of

appropriate agencies, shall submit a report on supply chains for the transportation

industrial base (as determined by the Secretary of Transportation).

(vi) The Secretary of Agriculture, in consultation with the heads of

appropriate agencies, shall submit a report on supply chains for the production of

agricultural commodities and food products.

(b) The APNSA and the APEP shall, as appropriate and in consultation with

the heads of appropriate agencies, recommend adjustments to the scope for each

industrial base assessment, including digital networks, services, assets, and data

(“digital products”), goods, services, and materials that are relevant within more

than one defined industrial base, and add new assessments, as appropriate, for

goods and materials not included in the above industrial base assessments.

(c) Each report submitted under subsection (a) of this section shall include a

review of:

(i) the critical goods and materials, as defined in section 6(b) of this

order, underlying the supply chain in question;

(ii) other essential goods and materials, as defined in section 6(d) of

this order, underlying the supply chain in question, including digital products;

(iii) the manufacturing or other capabilities necessary to produce the

materials identified in subsections (c)(i) and (c)(ii) of this section, including

emerging capabilities;

(iv) the defense, intelligence, cyber, homeland security, health, climate,

environmental, natural, market, economic, geopolitical, human-rights or

forced-labor risks or other contingencies that may disrupt, strain, compromise, or

eliminate the supply chain — including risks posed by supply chains’ reliance on

digital products that may be vulnerable to failures or exploitation, and risks

resulting from the elimination of, or failure to develop domestically, the

capabilities identified in subsection (c)(iii) of this section — and that are sufficiently

likely to arise so as to require reasonable preparation for their occurrence;

(v) the resilience and capacity of American manufacturing supply

chains and the industrial and agricultural base — whether civilian or defense —

of the United States to support national and economic security, emergency

preparedness, and the policy identified in section 1 of this order, in the event any

of the contingencies identified in subsection (c)(iv) of this section occurs,

including an assessment of:

(A) the manufacturing or other needed capacities of the United

States, including the ability to modernize to meet future needs;

(B) gaps in domestic manufacturing capabilities, including

nonexistent, extinct, threatened, or single-point-of-failure capabilities;

(C) supply chains with a single point of failure, single or dual

suppliers, or limited resilience, especially for subcontractors, as defined by section

44.101 of title 48, Code of Federal Regulations (Federal Acquisition Regulation);

(D) the location of key manufacturing and production assets, with

any significant risks identified in subsection (c)(iv) of this section posed by the

assets’ physical location;

(E) exclusive or dominant supply of critical goods and materials and

other essential goods and materials, as identified in subsections (c)(i) and (c)(ii) of

this section, by or through nations that are, or are likely to become, unfriendly or

unstable;

(F) the availability of substitutes or alternative sources for critical

goods and materials and other essential goods and materials, as identified in

subsections (c)(i) and (c)(ii) of this section;

(G) current domestic education and manufacturing workforce skills

for the relevant sector and identified gaps, opportunities, and potential best

practices in meeting the future workforce needs for the relevant sector;

(H) the need for research and development capacity to sustain

leadership in the development of critical goods and materials and other essential

goods and materials, as identified in subsections (c)(i) and (c)(ii) of this section;

(I) the role of transportation systems in supporting existing supply

chains and risks associated with those transportation systems; and

(J) the risks posed by climate change to the availability, production,

or transportation of critical goods and materials and other essential goods and

materials, as identified in subsections (c)(i) and (c)(ii) of this section.

(vi) allied and partner actions, including whether United States allies

and partners have also identified and prioritized the critical goods and materials

and other essential goods and materials identified in subsections (c)(i) and (c)(ii) of

this section, and possible avenues for international engagement. In assessing

these allied and partner actions, the heads of agencies shall consult with the

Secretary of State;

(vii) the primary causes of risks for any aspect of the relevant industrial

base and supply chains assessed as vulnerable pursuant to subsection (c)(v) of this

section;

(viii) a prioritization of the critical goods and materials and other

essential goods and materials, including digital products, identified in subsections

(c)(i) and (c)(ii) of this section for the purpose of identifying options and policy

recommendations. The prioritization shall be based on statutory or regulatory

requirements; importance to national security, emergency preparedness, and the

policy set forth in section 1 of this order; and the review conducted pursuant to

subsection (c)(v) of this section;

(ix) specific policy recommendations for ensuring a resilient supply

chain for the sector. Such recommendations may include sustainably reshoring

supply chains and developing domestic supplies, cooperating with allies and

partners to identify alternative supply chains, building redundancy into domestic

supply chains, ensuring and enlarging stockpiles, developing workforce

capabilities, enhancing access to financing, expanding research and development

to broaden supply chains, addressing risks due to vulnerabilities in digital products

relied on by supply chains, addressing risks posed by climate change, and any

other recommendations;

(x) any executive, legislative, regulatory, and policy changes and any

other actions to strengthen the capabilities identified in subsection (c)(iii) of this

section, and to prevent, avoid, or prepare for any of the contingencies identified in

subsection (c)(iv) of this section; and

(xi) proposals for improving the Government-wide effort to strengthen

supply chains, including proposals for coordinating actions required under this

order with ongoing efforts that could be considered duplicative of the work of this

order or with existing Government mechanisms that could be used to implement

this order in a more effective manner.

(d) The APNSA and the APEP shall review the reports required under

subsection (a) of this section and shall submit the reports to the President in an

unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

Sec. 5. General Review and Recommendations. As soon as practicable

following the submission of the reports required under section 4 of this order, the

APNSA and the APEP, in coordination with the heads of appropriate agencies, shall

provide to the President one or more reports reviewing the actions taken over the

previous year and making recommendations concerning:

(a) steps to strengthen the resilience of America’s supply chains;

(b) reforms needed to make supply chain analyses and actions more

effective, including statutory, regulatory, procedural, and institutional design

changes. The report shall include recommendations on whether additional

offices, personnel, resources, statistical data, or authorities are needed;

(c) establishment of a quadrennial supply chain review, including processes

and timelines regarding ongoing data gathering and supply chain monitoring;

(d) diplomatic, economic, security, trade policy, informational, and other

actions that can successfully engage allies and partners to strengthen supply

chains jointly or in coordination;

(e) insulating supply chain analyses and actions from conflicts of interest,

corruption, or the appearance of impropriety, to ensure integrity and public

confidence in supply chain analyses;

(f) reforms to domestic and international trade rules and agreements

needed to support supply chain resilience, security, diversity, and strength;

(g) education and workforce reforms needed to strengthen the domestic

industrial base;

(h) steps to ensure that the Government’s supply chain policy supports

small businesses, prevents monopolization, considers climate and other

environmental impacts, encourages economic growth in communities of color and

economically distressed areas, and ensures geographic dispersal of economic

activity across all regions of the United States; and

(i) Federal incentives and any amendments to Federal procurement

regulations that may be necessary to attract and retain investments in critical

goods and materials and other essential goods and materials, as defined in

sections 6(b) and 6(d) of this order, including any new programs that could

encourage both domestic and foreign investment in critical goods and materials.

Sec. 6. Definitions. For purposes of this order:

(a) “Agency” means any authority of the United States that is an “agency”

under 44 U.S.C. 3502(1), other than those considered to be independent

regulatory agencies, as defined in 44 U.S.C. 3502(5). “Agency” also means any

component of the Executive Office of the President.

(b) “Critical goods and materials” means goods and raw materials

currently defined under statute or regulation as “critical” materials, technologies,

or infrastructure.

(c) “Critical minerals” has the meaning given to that term in Executive

Order 13953 of September 30, 2020 (Addressing the Threat to the Domestic

Supply Chain From Reliance on Critical Minerals From Foreign Adversaries and

Supporting the Domestic Mining and Processing Industries).

(d) “Other essential goods and materials” means goods and materials that

are essential to national and economic security, emergency preparedness, or to

advance the policy set forth in section 1 of this order, but not included within the

definition of “critical goods and materials.”

(e) “Supply chain,” when used with reference to minerals, includes the

exploration, mining, concentration, separation, alloying, recycling, and

reprocessing of minerals.

Sec. 7. General Provisions. (a) Nothing in this order shall be construed to

impair or otherwise affect

(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency,

or the head thereof; or

(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and

Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.

(b) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and

subject to the availability of appropriations.

(c) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit,

substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the

United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or

agents, or any other person.

JOSEPH R. BIDEN JR.

THE WHITE HOUSE,

February 24, 2021.

美国供应链行政命令

2021年2月24日•

总统行动

根据美利坚合众国宪法和法律赋予我的总统授权，现命令如下： 第1节。政策。美国

需要有弹性，多样化和安全的供应链，以确保我们的经济繁荣和国家安全。大流行和其他

生物威胁，网络攻击，气候冲击和极端天气事件，恐怖袭击，地缘政治和经济竞争以及其

他情况会降低关键的生产能力以及关键产品，产品和服务的可用性和完整性。富有弹性的

美国供应链将振兴和重建国内制造能力，保持美国在研发方面的竞争优势，并创造高薪工

作。他们还将支持小型企业，促进繁荣，推进应对气候变化的斗争，并鼓励有色人种和经

济困难地区的经济增长。 更具弹性的供应链是安全且多样化的-促进了更大的国内生产，

一系列的供应，内置的冗余，充足的库存，安全可靠的数字网络以及世界一流的美国制造

基地和劳动力。此外，与具有共同价值观的盟国和伙伴在具有复原力的供应链上进行密切

合作将促进集体经济和国家安全，并增强应对国际灾难和紧急情况的能力。 因此，美国政

府的政策是加强美国供应链的弹性。

秒2.协调。国家安全事务总统助理（APNSA）和经济政策总统助理（APEP）应通过

2021年2月4日《国家安全备忘录2》确定的跨机构程序，协调执行该命令所需的行政部

门行动。 （更新国家安全委员会系统）。在执行此命令时，机构负责人应酌情咨询外部利

益相关者，例如行业，学术界，非政府组织，社区，工会以及州，地方和部落政府的利益

相关者，以实现此订单第1节中确定的政策。

秒3. 100天供应链审查。

（a）为推进本订单第1节所述的政策，APNSA和APEP应与本订单第6（a）节中定

义的适当机构负责人协调，完成对供应链风险的审查（如本节（b）小节所述）在此订单发

出之日起100天内。

（b）指定的机构负责人应在本命令发出之日起100天内，通过APNSA和APEP向

总统提交以下报告： （i）商务部长应与有关机构负责人协商，提交报告，确定半导体制

造和先进封装供应链中的风险，并提出应对这些风险的政策建议。报告应包括该订单第4

（c）节中描述的项目。 （ii）能源部长应与有关机构负责人协商，提交报告，确定高容量

电池（包括电动汽车电池）供应链中的风险，并提出应对这些风险的政策建议。报告应包

括该订单第4（c）节中描述的项目。 （iii）国防部长（作为国防储备管理人）应与有关机

构负责人协商，提交报告，确定关键矿物和其他战略材料（包括稀土元素）在供应链中的

风险（ （由国防部长确定），以及针对这些风险的政策建议。该报告还应描述和更新根据

2020年9月30日第13953号行政命令（解决依赖于来自国外对手的关键矿物对国内供

应链的威胁并支持国内采矿和加工业）所做的工作。报告应包括该订单第4（c）节中描述

的项目。 （iv）卫生和公共服务部长应与适当机构的负责人协商，提交报告，确定药品和

活性药物成分的供应链中的风险，并提出应对这些风险的政策建议。该报告应补充正在进

行的工作，以确保根据2021年1月21日第14001号行政命令（可持续公共卫生供应链）

进行的应对COVID-19大流行所需的关键项目（包括个人防护设备）的供应链。该报告应

包括本条第4款（c）项中所述的项目或

（vi）盟国和伙伴行动，包括美国盟国和伙伴是否也已确定本节（c）（i）和（c）（ii）

小节中确定的关键物品和材料以及其他基本物品和材料并确定优先顺序，以及国际参与的

可能途径。在评估这些同盟和伙伴行动时，机构负责人应与国务卿协商； （vii）根据本节

（c）（v）小节被评估为脆弱的相关产业基础和供应链的各个方面的风险的主要原因； （viii）

确定本节（c）（i）和（c）（ii）小节中确定的关键商品和材料以及其他重要商品和材料（包

括数字产品）的优先级，目的是确定备选方案和政策建议。优先顺序应基于法律或法规要

求；对国家安全，紧急情况的准备以及该命令第1节中规定的政策的重要性；以及根据本

节（c）（v）进行的审核； （ix）确保该行业弹性供应链的具体政策建议。这些建议可能

包括可持续地重新供应链和发展国内供应，与盟国和合作伙伴合作以查明替代供应链，在

国内供应链中建立冗余，确保和扩大库存，发展劳动力能力，增加获得融资的机会，将研

究和开发扩大到拓宽供应链，应对由于供应链所依赖的数字产品漏洞引起的风险，应对气

候变化带来的风险，以及任何其他建议； （x）任何行政，立法，法规和政策变更以及采

取任何其他措施来增强本节（c）（iii）小节确定的能力，并防止，避免或为小节确定的任

何突发事件做好准备本条（c）（iv）；和 （xi）关于改善整个政府加强供应链的努力的提议，

包括关于根据该命令所需采取的行动与可以被认为与该命令的工作重复的现行努力或与可

用于执行该命令的现有政府机制进行协调的提议以更有效的方式执行此命令。 （d）APNSA

和APEP应审查本节（a）款要求的报告，并应以未分类的形式将报告提交给总统，但可以

包括分类的附件。

秒5.总体审查和建议。在根据本命令第4节要求提交报告后，APNSA和APEP应在

适当机构负责人的协调下，在切实可行的范围内尽快向主席提供一份或多份报告，以回顾

上一年采取的行动并就以下方面提出建议： （a）采取措施加强美国供应链的弹性； （b）

需要进行的改革，以使供应链分析和行动更加有效，包括法定，监管，程序和体制设计变

更。报告应包括关于是否需要增加办事处，人员，资源，统计数据或主管部门的建议； （c）

建立每四年一次的供应链审查，包括有关正在进行的数据收集和供应链监控的过程和时间

表； （d）外交，经济，安全，贸易政策，信息和其他行动，可以成功地促使盟国和合作

伙伴共同或协调地加强供应链； （e）将供应链分析和行动与利益冲突，腐败或不当行为

的出现隔离开来，以确保完整性和公众对供应链分析的信心； （f）改革国内和国际贸易

规则和协议，以支持供应链的弹性，安全性，多样性和实力； （g）加强国内工业基础所

需的教育和劳动力改革； （h）确保政府的供应链政策支持小型企业，防止垄断，考虑气

候和其他环境影响，鼓励有色社区和经济困难地区的经济增长，并确保经济活动在地理上

分散到各个地区的步骤美国;和 （i）根据本命令第6（b）和6（d）节的规定，为吸引和

保留对关键商品和材料以及其他基本商品和材料的投资而可能需要的联邦奖励措施和对联

邦采购法规的任何修正，包括任何可能鼓励国内外在关键商品和材料上进行投资的新计划。

秒6.定义。就此订单而言： （a）“代理机构”是指美国《美国法典》第44款规定下

为“代理机构”的美国任何权威机构。 3502（1），但根据美国法典第44条的定义被认为

是独立的监管机构的除外。 3502（5）。 “机构”也指总统执行办公室的任何组成部分。

（b）“关键商品和材料”是指根据法规或法规当前定义为“关键”材料，技术或基础设施

的商品和原材料。 （c）“关键矿物”具有2020年9月30日第13953号行政命令中的术

语（解决因依赖外国对手的关键矿物对国内供应链的威胁并支持国内采矿和加工业）。 （d）

“其他必需品和材料”是指对国家和经济安全，紧急情况准备或推进本命令第1节规定的

政策必不可少的，但不包括在“重要产品”定义中的材料和材料。和材料。” （e）“供应

链”在涉及矿物时使用，包括矿物的勘探，开采，浓缩，分离，合金化，再循环和再加工。

秒7.一般规定。 （a）此命令中的任何内容均不得解释为损害或以其他方式影响 （i）

法律授予执行部门或机构或其负责人的权力；或者 （ii）管理和预算局局长与预算，行政

或立法提案有关的职能。 （b）该命令应根据适用法律并在获得拨款的前提下执行。 （c）

该命令无意于也不会创造任何权利或利益，无论是实质性的还是程序性的，任何一方均可

对美国，其部门，机关或实体，其高级职员，雇员在法律上或衡平法下执行，代理商或任

何其他人。

约瑟夫·比登（JOSEPH R. 白宫 2021年2月24日

本文标签： 供应链报告美国关键包括