At last year’s DEF CON, I wandered into a panel with voting industry leaders from the public and private sectors. Towards the end, the facilitator asked the room filled with 200 or so security experts and hackers if they thought the US should have online voting.

在去年的DEF CON上，我走进了一个由来自公共和私营部门的投票行业领导者组成的小组。 最后，主持人询问了200位左右的安全专家和黑客，他们是否认为美国应该进行在线投票。

Three brave souls raised their hands. They were booed. One put his hand down, looking embarrassed.

三个勇敢的灵魂举起了手。 他们被嘘。 一只手放下，看上去很尴尬。

So why are experts so unanimous on this topic?

那么，为什么专家如此一致呢？

As former presidential candidate Andrew Yang tweeted recently:

前总统候选人安德鲁·杨(Andrew Yang)最近在推特上写道：

Doesn’t he have a point? Vote by mail has gotten some attention recently but do we really want to be mailing things on paper when we have email? Voting in person isn’t wise to do in a pandemic, so it seems like building an e-voting system would be best in the current climate.

他没要点吗？ 最近，通过邮件投票引起了人们的关注，但是，当我们收到电子邮件时，我们真的想将邮件邮寄到纸上吗？ 在大流行中亲自投票并不明智，因此，在当前气候下，建立电子投票系统似乎是最佳选择。

Voting through a website or app sounds like a no-brainer.

通过网站或应用程序投票听起来很容易。

Sure, there might be cybersecurity risks, but surely it’s not physically impossible to build something safe enough.

当然，可能存在网络安全风险，但是肯定地，在物理上构建足够安全的东西并不是没有可能 。

Besides, e-voting would surely increase turnout among young people. Given this, wouldn’t the risks be worth it? Don’t some countries like Estonia already do voting online with no problems? Could we vote online in the US?

此外，电子投票肯定会增加年轻人的投票率。 鉴于此，风险不值得吗？ 像爱沙尼亚这样的国家是否已经可以毫无问题地进行在线投票？ 我们可以在美国在线投票吗？

—> No.

->不行

Online voting would be disastrous especially for the United States. There are better things we can and should do to make voting accessible.

在线投票将是灾难性的，尤其是对于美国。 我们可以做并且应该做的更好的事情可以使投票变得容易。

第一节：自由公正的选举 (Section 1: Free and Fair Elections)

The stakes for voting in the US are higher than anything else we could do over the internet. It’s more important than banking, passport applications, and yes, parking tickets.

在美国进行投票的赌注比我们在互联网上能做的任何其他事情都要高。 它比银行业务，护照申请以及停车票更重要。

Not only would it be disastrous for the vote to be rigged, there are also immense incentives for powerful players (countries and corporations) to attempt it. This is the most important thing I want readers to come away from this article with. Voting systems need to be more secure than anything else we have. (with the exception of maybe medical devices like pacemaker software. Oops.)

操纵投票不仅会造成灾难性的后果，而且对于有力的参与者(国家和公司)尝试投票也有巨大的激励作用。 这是我希望读者从中脱颖而出的最重要的事情。 投票系统必须比我们拥有的任何其他系统更安全。 (除了可能是诸如起搏器软件之类的医疗设备。 哎呀。 )

It’s worth starting out by defining the required characteristics of a free and fair election. If citizens don’t believe a vote is fair, this is very dangerous for the stability of a democracy. If a malicious actor can change the outcome of a vote, they can topple a whole country and disrupt a whole economy. If a malicious actor can disrupt an economy like the US, then they can disrupt the global economy.

值得一开始的是定义自由公正选举的必要特征。 如果公民不相信投票是公平的，这对于民主的稳定是非常危险的。 如果恶意行为者可以改变投票结果，则他们可以推翻整个国家并破坏整个经济。 如果恶意行为者可以破坏美国这样的经济，那么他们就可以破坏全球经济。

It is crucial that voting is done right in America. So how is a free and fair election done right? What features does it require?

在美国正确进行投票至关重要。 那么，如何自由，公正地进行选举呢？ 它需要什么功能？

可审核+准确 (Auditable + Accurate)

Votes must be counted accurately. Failing that, it must be possible to audit them without running another election.

投票数必须准确计算。 如果不这样做，就可以在不进行另一次选举的情况下对它们进行审计。

If someone doesn’t think the vote was fair, there needs to be a way to go in and prove that it was or rectify the tally if it wasn’t. This is so we don’t have to make voters vote again. If those in power are unwilling to recount or run another election, that’s a failure.

如果有人认为投票不公平，则需要有一种方法可以证明它是正确的，或者如果不正确，则可以纠正该错误。 这样一来，我们不必让选民再次投票。 如果当权者不愿重述或进行另一次选举，那是失败的。

匿名 (Anonymous)

This is an often overlooked but crucial aspect of a good voting system. Voting should be anonymous because if someone tries to pay or intimidate you into voting a certain way, it should at least be impossible for them to verify that you complied. It’s also important for safety. You don’t want extremists going after people who voted a certain way. Even if it’s illegal to bribe or intimidate voters, anonymity makes it impractical for criminals to try on any kind of scale.

这是好的投票系统经常被忽视但至关重要的方面。 投票应该是匿名的，因为如果有人试图以某种方式支付或恐吓您投票，那么他们至少应该不可能验证您是否遵守。 对于安全性也很重要。 您不希望极端分子追随以某种方式投票的人。 即使贿赂或恐吓选民是非法的，匿名也使犯罪分子以任何规模进行尝试都是不切实际的。

无障碍 (Accessible)

If someone is qualified to vote, they should be able to vote easily for anyone they want and to have their vote counted. That means, among other things, that voters who can’t afford to take time off work should be able to vote and that voters with disabilities must have accessibility services provided.

如果某人有资格投票，那么他们应该能够轻松地为他们想要的任何人投票，并计算出他们的票数。 这意味着，除其他事项外，那些无力休假的选民应该能够投票，而残疾选民必须提供无障碍服务。

Making an election less accessible is as easy as cutting funding in certain areas. I could argue that our current election system is not accessible enough. It’s the biggest weakness of in-person voting in America.

减少选举的介入就像在某些领域削减资金一样容易。 我可以争辩说，我们目前的选举制度不够普及。 这是美国面对面投票的最大弱点。

All of these started with As. This was not on purpose but it’s catchy: Accurate, Auditable, Anonymous and Accessible. Heh.

所有这些都始于As。 这不是故意的，但很容易上手：准确，可审核，匿名和​​可访问。 嘿。

There are countries who have accessible non-online voting systems. Inaccessibility is more a result of corruption than inherent flaws with in-person voting. As we’ll see, these flaws do not out-weight the benefits.

有些国家拥有可访问的非在线投票系统。 不可访问性更多是腐败的结果，而不是亲自投票的固有缺陷。 就像我们将看到的那样，这些缺陷并没有超过收益。

第2节：软件安全性 (Section 2: Software Security)

Lets talk about computers and software. Software is very very bad. I say this as a software engineer and a security person myself. It is so incredibly easy to write bad code. Web applications and mobile apps are especially bad.

让我们谈谈计算机和软件。 软件非常非常糟糕。 我自己说的是软件工程师和安全人员。 编写错误的代码非常容易 。 Web应用程序和移动应用程序尤其糟糕。

Furthermore, humans have to manage software systems and humans are even worse than computers. Look at the recent Twitter hack. If Twitter is pinning admin credentials to their Slack channel, do you think Trump-appointees will do better?

此外，人类必须管理软件系统，人类甚至比计算机还要糟糕。 看一下最近的Twitter hack。 如果Twitter将管理员凭据固定在其Slack频道上，您认为特朗普任命的人会做得更好吗？

Even current voting machines have been proven time and time again to have critical flaws that would allow a hacker to change, add, or delete votes. These voting booths aren’t even supposed to be connected to the internet yet some were. In swing districts.

即使目前的投票机已经被证明的时间和时间 再次有严重漏洞将允许黑客改变，添加或删除票。 这些投票亭甚至都不应该连接到互联网，但有些可以 。 在摇摆区。

Why are voting machines insecure? Is it because government contractors are grifters? Is it because the US government can’t be trusted to do anything right? No. Mostly it’s that software is very hard to do 100% right.

为什么投票机不安全？ 是因为政府承包商是礼物吗？ 是因为不能相信美国政府做正确的事吗？ 不。多数情况下， 软件很难100％正确地完成 。

If we can’t have voting booths which are secure, we certainly can’t have an app or a website that is secure. As an application security person, I specialize in the flaws websites can have and the idea of a voting website is terrifying to me. Websites and mobile apps are complicated, have a high potential for flaws, and can be attacked from many angles.

如果我们没有安全的投票站 ，那么我们当然也不会有安全的应用程序或网站。 作为应用程序安全人员，我专门研究网站可能存在的漏洞，而投票网站的想法令我感到恐惧 。 网站和移动应用程序很复杂，存在很大的潜在漏洞 ，并且可以从多个角度进行攻击。

There’s also the problem of scale. Many of these voting booths are (mostly) only vulnerable to physical attacks: where a hacker can walk in and take it apart or plug in a USB drive. This attack is risky and not very effective (relatively) because you can only target one booth at a time, limiting you to certain districts (which is still a big problem). With a website or app, a cybercriminal could rig a vote on a much wider scale from the comfort of their own home somewhere they are unlikely to be apprehended and potentially never even detected.

还有规模问题。 这些投票亭中的许多(大部分)仅容易受到物理攻击：黑客可以在其中进入并拆开它或插入USB驱动器。 这种攻击是有风险的，并且效果不佳(相对而言)，因为您一次只能定位一个摊位，将您限制在某些区域(这仍然是一个大问题)。 有了网站或应用程序，网络犯罪分子就可以在他们不太可能被逮捕甚至根本不会被发现的地方，从自己舒适的家中获得更大范围的投票。

I will also be the first to say that the US government is so bad at doing things because of austerity and the threat of budget cuts, not because government is inherently incompetent. Governments are capable of implementing good programs under competent leadership, I just don’t think an online voting system is one of them. Even cybersecurity companies end up with breaches and hacks. No matter how good your security and auditing process, no software will ever be un-hackable.

我也将是第一个说美国政府之所以如此行事，是因为紧缩政策和削减预算的威胁，而不是因为政府本来就没有能力。 政府有能力在主管领导下实施良好的计划，但我只是认为在线投票系统不是其中之一。 甚至网络安全公司也最终遭受破坏和黑客攻击。 无论您的安全性和审核过程多么出色，都不会有任何软件无法破解。

But what if… if it is possible for voting software to be implemented effectively, 100% secure, 100% maintained even through incompetent administrations, kept up to date with no budget cuts — would it be a good idea? Would it be worth the extra voter turnout?

但是，如果……如果可以有效地实施投票软件，甚至通过不称职的管理部门也可以100％安全，100％维护，保持最新且不削减预算的话，那会是个好主意吗？ 值得额外的选民投票吗？

The answer is still no. In fact, security of the system itself isn’t even the primary reason we’re so against online voting.

答案是否定的。 实际上， 系统本身的安全性甚至不是我们反对在线投票的主要原因。

第三节：正确使用 (Section 3: Proper Usage)

The problem with voting is that humans have to do it — and humans are idiots. Once again we have a problem of scale. With in-person voting you might be able to trick an individual voter, but that’s just as effective as convincing them to vote for your candidate through regular campaigning. With online voting, targeting voters with scams, malware, or intimidation becomes a viable strategy.

投票的问题是人类必须这样做-人类是白痴。 我们再次遇到规模问题。 通过面对面投票，您也许可以欺骗单个选民，但这与说服他们通过常规竞选为您的候选人投票一样有效。 通过在线投票， 以诈骗，恶意软件或恐吓为目标选民成为可行的策略 。

骗局 (Scams)

Any information you might use in an online voting system to verify your identity can be stolen. Once it is stolen it is permanently out there: social security numbers, date/location of birth, state ID numbers— any or all of these is insufficient proof that you are a real voter.

您可能会在在线投票系统中使用的用于验证身份的任何信息均被盗 。 一旦被盗，它将永久存在：社会保险号，出生日期/地点，州身份证号-这些中的任何一个或全部都不足以证明您是真正的选民。

Estonia uses a national ID to authenticate and some e-voting startups want to use biometrics. These are better than how we pay taxes now but you can still fool someone into using either of those in a malicious app.

爱沙尼亚使用国家ID进行身份验证，一些电子投票初创公司希望使用生物识别技术。 这比我们现在的纳税方式要好，但是您仍然可以欺骗某人在恶意应用程序中使用其中任何一个 。

If you work at a big company, maybe you have a benevolent security team that periodically tries to get you clicking on links in emails designed to steal your credentials. Maybe you’ve even fallen for one of these schemes yourself, if not at work then maybe you’ve accidentally clicked on a malicious link in an email at home. This is called phishing.

如果您在一家大公司工作，也许您有一个仁慈的安全团队，它会定期尝试让您单击旨在窃取您的凭据的电子邮件中的链接。 也许您自己甚至不喜欢其中一种方案，如果不在工作中，则可能是您不小心点击了家里电子邮件中的恶意链接。 这称为网络钓鱼 。

Companies spend so much effort trying to immunize employees against this type of attack because it is extremely effective.

公司花了很多精力试图使员工免受这种攻击，因为它非常有效 。

If you don’t believe me that a critical mass of Americans are likely to fall for voting scams, read this (approachable, well written) study on online scams. 23% of people targeted by the scams in this study lost money. That is more than enough to sway a swing district.

如果您不相信我， 很多美国人可能会因为投票诈骗而堕落 ，请阅读有关在线诈骗的这份(适当的，写得很好的) 研究报告 。 在这项研究中，以诈骗为目标的人中有23％损失了钱。 这足以摇摆摇摆区。

Perhaps the most similar type of scam to our hypothetical voting rackets are fake IRS scams. There are already widespread scams that steal taxpayer information, file taxes to claim returns, and extort folks by threatening to send in the FBI, CBP or ICE. In the study above, 15% of targets engaged with the IRS scammers while 3% lost money. Furthermore, these are perpetrated by low-skill cybercriminals with limited resources just looking to make easy money. If they can do it, much more competent state actors can do it better.

可能与假设的投票球拍最相似的骗局是伪造的IRS骗局。 已经有广泛的骗局，它们窃取纳税人的信息，归档税款以要求退还并通过威胁派遣FBI，CBP或ICE来勒索民众。 在上面的研究中，有15％的目标与IRS骗子有关，而3％的人蒙受了损失 。 此外，这些都是由技能有限的低技能网络罪犯所犯，他们只是想赚钱。 如果他们能做到，那么更有能力的国家行为者就会做得更好 。

Even besides the risk of mass voter fraud, residents would be more at risk of having their private information stolen and sold by virtue of having an online voting system.

即使存在大规模选民欺诈的风险，居民也将更具有通过在线投票系统窃取和出售其私人信息的风险 。

E-voting puts every voter at risk whether they participate or not.

电子投票使每个投票者(无论是否参加)都处于危险之中。

恶意软件，恐吓和贿赂 (Malware, Intimidation, and Bribery)

I mentioned above that anonymity is crucial for a free and fair election. With a website or an app, you can never guarantee anonymity. What if someone is voting on a library computer? What if they’re viewing the site through an in-app browser without realizing it? What if they’ve installed a malicious chrome extension or have spyware on their computer? What if someone makes a fake version of the voting app?

我在上面提到，匿名对于自由和公正的选举至关重要。 使用网站或应用程序，您永远无法保证匿名 。 如果有人在图书馆的计算机上投票怎么办？ 如果他们在没有意识到的情况下通过应用内浏览器查看网站怎么办？ 如果他们在计算机上安装了恶意的Chrome扩展程序或间谍软件，该怎么办？ 如果有人制作了虚假版本的投票应用程序怎么办？

This might not sound like a huge deal — but consider this scenario: A big state actor, let’s say for example China, has control over a popular app called Kit Kot. Now the Chinese government, under the guise of an anonymous hacker, is going to try to intimidate voters by telling them that they have hacked your phone. They provide proof such as images and location data. If you don’t vote the way they want you to or tell anyone you were threatened, they’ll know and leak your nudes, texts, location, or anything else you don’t want public. They’ll know if you in particular don’t vote for their candidate because they’re an omnipotent superhacker — as evidenced by the fact they hacked your phone. Really they know stuff about you because they are the Chinese government and you let Kit Kot have too many permissions on your phone.

这听起来似乎没什么大不了的-但请考虑以下情况：某大型州演员(例如， 中国 )已经控制了一个流行的名为Kit Kot的应用。 现在，中国政府以匿名黑客的幌子，试图通过告诉选民他们已经入侵了您的手机来恐吓选民。 它们提供图像和位置数据等证明。 如果您不按照他们希望的方式进行投票，或者不告诉您受到威胁的任何人，他们就会知道并泄露您的裸体，文字，位置或其他您不想公开的内容。 他们会知道您是否特别不投票选他们的候选人，因为他们是一个无所不能的超级黑客-他们入侵您手机的事实证明了这一点。 确实，他们了解您的情况是因为他们是中国政府，您让Kit Kot在手机上拥有太多权限。

Believable? Maybe. It’s feasible, though maybe not practical. Lets try another example.

可信的？ 也许。 这是可行的，尽管可能不切实际。 让我们尝试另一个示例。

A US-based organization, shall we say the US Gun Guild (UGG), really wants to keep a certain congress person with a low approval rating in office — say Mitchel MacConnel. To make sure he wins, they hire a Russia-based firm to bribe voters in swing states to vote for him. The firm poses as some kind of legal voter turnout initiative and contacts voters in swing states, maybe even paying them half up-front. They simply need to install this Chrome extension, go to the voting website, and cast their vote for the candidate. Would a critical mass of people do this? How much money would need to be offered?

我们可以说，美国的一个美国组织，就是美国枪业协会(UGG)，实际上是想让某个国会议员的批准率较低，例如米切尔·麦康奈尔(Mitchel MacConnel)。 为了确保他获胜，他们聘请了一家俄罗斯公司贿赂摇摆州的选民，为他投票。 该公司冒充某种合法的选民投票权，并与摇摆州的选民联系，甚至可能提前支付一半。 他们只需要安装此Chrome扩展程序，转到投票网站，然后为候选人投票。 一定数量的人会这样做吗？ 需要提供多少钱？

These scams I’ve come up with are easy to detect and maybe a little bit convoluted. They could sway the vote. If the party in power liked the outcome, they may not do anything about it. Even if something was done about it, evidence of even one of these scams would destroy voter confidence in the outcome, undermining the democratic process.

我提出的这些骗局很容易检测，也许有些令人费解。 他们可以投票。 如果执政党喜欢结果，他们可能对此无能为力。 即使采取了一些措施，即使其中一种骗局的证据也会破坏选民对选举结果的信心 ，从而破坏民主进程。

If someone tried something like this, the best case scenario is that a redo-election would have to be conducted using in-person paper ballots. We’re either back to square one or picking up pitchforks.

如果有人尝试过这种方法，最好的情况是必须使用当面的纸票进行重选。 我们要么回到正题，要么拿起干草叉。

第4节：爱沙尼亚 (Section 4: Estonia)

So far we’ve been speaking in terms of “could happen”, “would happen” but hasn’t this been tried by anyone? Surely e-voting hasn’t failed in every single instance.

到目前为止，我们一直在谈论“可能发生”，“将会发生”，但这不是有人尝试过的吗？ 当然，在每个实例中进行电子投票都不会失败。

Online voting has been tried lots of times and has mostly failed spectacularly. The one exception to this rule is Estonia.

在线投票已经尝试了很多次，但大多数都以失败告终。 爱沙尼亚是该规则的一个例外。

If you don’t know anything about Estonia (*cough* Americans), it is a Nordic country which borders Russia, has wifi in forests, and some of the most competent tech usage in government of anywhere in the world. If anyone could do this right, it would be them .

如果您对爱沙尼亚(*咳嗽*美国人)一无所知，那它是一个与俄罗斯接壤的北欧国家， 在森林中设有无线网络 ，并且在世界任何地方的政府中都拥有一些最有能力的技术用途。 如果有人能做到这一点，那就是他们。

They have been holding digital elections since 2005. 43% of voters use the online voting platform, and so far there has been no evidence of meddling. They share a border with Russia who has some pretty good incentives as well as the capability to influence their elections.

自2005年以来，他们一直在举行数字选举。43％的选民使用在线投票平台，到目前为止，还没有任何干预的迹象。 他们与俄罗斯接壤，俄罗斯有一些很好的激励机制以及影响选举的能力。

Wait doesn’t this negate the whole argument?

等等，这是否会否定整个论点？

Well, it’s true that nothing seems to have gone wrong yet and maybe nothing ever will.

好吧，没错，似乎没有错，也许永远不会错。

Researchers have indeed been able to demonstrate flaws that could compromise the integrity of the Estonian election. They were able to change an outcome of a simulated election in a lab environment in a way that would go undetected. To quote their conclusions:

研究人员确实已经能够证明可能损害爱沙尼亚选举完整性的缺陷 。 他们能够以一种无法发现的方式更改实验室环境中模拟选举的结果。 引用他们的结论：

Based on our tests, we conclude that a state-level attacker, sophisticated criminal, or dishonest insider could defeat both the technological and procedural controls in order to manipulate election outcomes. Short of this, there are abundant ways that such an attacker could disrupt the voting process or cast doubt on the legitimacy of results

根据我们的测试，我们得出的结论是，州级攻击者，老练的犯罪分子或不诚实的内部人员可能会击败技术和程序控制，从而操纵选举结果。 除此之外，还有很多方法可以使此类攻击者破坏投票过程或对结果的合法性产生怀疑

In an entertaining read, an analyst for Estonia’s Information System Authority reacted to this by attacking the researcher’s credentials and criticizing their disclosure methods. Other than this I wasn’t able to find a good response to this research from the government (but I don’t speak Estonian so may have missed important sources on this topic).

爱沙尼亚信息系统管理局的分析师在一次有趣的阅​​读中通过攻击研究人员的证书和批评其披露方法来对此做出回应。 除此之外，政府无法对这项研究做出好的回应(但是我不会说爱沙尼亚语，因此可能错过了有关该主题的重要资料)。

It’s important to note that Estonia isn’t a global superpower. If their election were rigged it would be really bad for them, but bad actors (other than Russia, potentially) don’t have as much incentive to do so as they would for America. If the USA goes fascist, the whole world is in danger.

必须指出的是，爱沙尼亚不是全球超级大国。 如果操纵他们的选举对他们来说确实是一件坏事，但是坏演员(可能是俄罗斯以外的其他国家)这样做的动机却不如美国。 如果美国成为法西斯主义者，那么整个世界都将处于危险之中。

在线投票会增加投票率吗？ (Would Online Voting Actually Increase Turnout?)

After all that, we didn’t even stop to consider if our intuition was correct. If it’s young people who don’t vote and young people who can’t afford to take time off work (in America), then surely mobile/online voting would help?

毕竟，我们甚至没有停止考虑我们的直觉是否正确。 如果是不投票的年轻人和无力请假的年轻人(在美国)，那么移动/在线投票肯定会有所帮助吗？

Unfortunately, a few studies conclude that it would not increase turnout or would help very little. Researchers in Switzerland did a study on their e-voting system. They found that it did not increase voter turnout.

不幸的是，一些研究得出的结论是，这样做不会增加投票率，或者只会带来很小的帮助。 瑞士的研究人员对其电子投票系统进行了研究 。 他们发现这并没有增加选民的投票率。

Estonia’s aforementioned online voting platform has been going for several years now. A study concluded that it had no effect on voter turnout. On the other hand, a study on the West Virginia e-voting platform suggests that it raised participation by 3–5%.

爱沙尼亚前面提到的在线投票平台已经运行了好几年。 一项研究得出结论，这对选民投票率没有影响。 另一方面，对西弗吉尼亚州电子投票平台的一项研究表明，该平台将参与率提高了3–5％。

It’s hard to say if online voting would increase participation over time if voters became more comfortable with the idea. Early evidence suggests that it’s the people who already vote who would use these systems.

很难说，如果选民对这一想法更加满意，在线投票是否会随着时间的推移而增加参与度。 早期证据表明，已经投票的人会使用这些系统。

摘要 (Summary)

We’ve gone over a lot here so lets recap.

我们在这里进行了很多介绍，让我们回顾一下。

1. The features of a free and fair election are Accurate, Auditable, Anonymous and Accessible
   自由公正选举的特征是准确，可审核，匿名和​​可访问
2. American elections suffer from a lack of accessibility which is a big problem that online voting would improve
   美国选举因缺乏可及性而遭受苦难，这是在线投票会改善的一个大问题
3. Auditable and Anonymous are the two hardest ones when talking about digital voting
   在谈论数字投票时，可审核和匿名是最难的两个

4. Elections are critically important to get right every time and bad actors have great incentives to compromise them especially in a global super power like the United States.

   选举对于每次都正确至关重要，而不良行为者则有很大的动机来折衷他们， 尤其是在像美国这样的全球超级大国中。

5. Computers are very bad and digital security is hard
   电脑非常糟糕，数字安全也很难
6. Not voting in person eliminates the ability to keep votes anonymous in several ways — and this (I would argue) is demonstrably an unsolvable problem
   不亲自投票会以多种方式消除保持匿名投票的能力-这(我想辩解)显然是一个无法解决的问题
7. Internet voting doesn’t actually increase voter turnout (probably)
   互联网投票实际上并没有增加选民的投票率(可能)

那么我们该怎么办？ (So What Do We Do?)

I’ll be the first to say that new ideas are scrutinized more harshly than obviously bad old ideas. In this case however, the old way of voting in person and on paper is a better way than digital voting.

我将是第一个说新想法比显然不好的老想法受到更严格审查的人。 但是，在这种情况下，与数字投票相比，旧的亲自和书面投票方式是更好的方式。

Voter turnout is a problem that needs to be solved but online/mobile voting is not the answer. Here are some ideas from experts on the topic:

选民投票率是一个需要解决的问题，但在线/移动投票并不是答案。 以下是有关该主题的专家的一些想法：

脚注 (Footnotes)

邮寄投票 (Vote by Mail)

I think vote by mail is a good middle ground that makes voting more accessible. As an Oregonian, I love the ability to get my ballot in the mail and drop it in a mailbox. It’s so much nicer than lining up at the polls.

我认为通过邮寄投票是使投票更容易获得的良好中间立场。 作为俄勒冈人，我很喜欢将选票寄到邮件中并将其放入邮箱的能力。 这比排队参加民意调查要好得多。

Voting by mail still has a problem of privacy/authenticity, it just can’t be exploited by organized crime and foreign powers as easily. Potentially, it is exploited by family members who vote twice. This might make the vote skew a little bit in some areas (husbands using their wive’s ballot and voting more Republican, young progressives using their aging parent’s ballots). It’s better than mobile/online voting but worse than in-person with paper.

邮寄投票仍然存在隐私/真实性问题，只是不能轻易被有组织犯罪和外国势力利用。 可能会受到两次投票的家庭成员的利用。 这可能会使投票在某些方面有所偏差(丈夫使用妻子的选票，而更多的共和党，年轻的进步派则使用年迈的父母的选票投票)。 这比移动/在线投票要好，但比面对面的书面投票要差。

It’s a good option when voting in person isn’t feasible like for citizens overseas or in the case of a global pandemic. We need vote by mail for everyone in time for November so people don’t die voting in one of the most important elections ever.

如果无法亲自投票(例如针对海外公民)或发生全球性大流行，这是一个不错的选择。 我们需要在11月之前通过邮件为所有人进行投票，以使人们不会在有史以来最重要的选举中死于投票。

区块链 (Blockchain)

You may notice that I haven’t mentioned blockchain at all in this article. This is partially because if you read this whole thing (and I did my job properly), you should understand why simply replacing the storage and read/write method for votes won’t solve any of the problems we have.

您可能会注意到，我在本文中根本没有提到区块链。 部分原因是，如果您阅读了整个内容(并且我做得很好)，您应该了解为什么简单地替换投票的存储和读/写方法并不能解决我们遇到的任何问题。

Thanks for reading this very long article!

感谢您阅读这篇很长的文章！